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Democracy, Gender Equality, and Customary
Law: Constitutionalizing Internal Cultural
Disruption
SUSAN H. WILLIAMS*
ABSTRACT

Customary law often includes gender discriminatory rules that
violate women's rights under constitutional equality guarantees.
Dialogic democracy theory offers valuable tools that can help a legal
system both to protect customary law and to protect the equality of its
women citizens. By focusing on the need for challenge and on the
dialogue within the cultural community, the legal system can create
incentives and conditions to support the capacity of women to shape the
customary law of their own communities. This approach is necessary
because legal rights for women, when imposed by the largersociety, often
result in backlash within minority communities. In the long run, the
structuralinequality of women cannot be addressed by legal rights alone,
but must be addressed by programs that seek to give women the power
within their communities to achieve their own equality.
INTRODUCTION

Customary legal systems in many countries pose a serious threat to
women's equality rights by legitimizing and enforcing gender
discriminatory rules with respect to marriage, divorce, property, and a
host of other issues. But freedom to practice one's culture and religion is
also a fundamental human right. Is it possible, then, for a country to

both respect and make space for the customary legal systems of its
various populations and, at the same time, protect the equality rights of
* Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law and Director, Center for Constitutional
Democracy, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I would like to thank Susan
Tanner, Huong Thi Nguyen, and Christina Clark for their research assistance on various
stages of this project. Parts I, II, and III of this article closely track the arguments I have
made in Democratic Theory, Feminist Theory and Constitutionalism: The Challenge of
Multiculturalism, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIoNALIsM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (Beverly
Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez, & Tsvi Kahane eds., Cambridge U. Press. forthcoming 2011).
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its women citizens? Or must the nation simply choose between these
two projects, necessarily sacrificing one to the other? In this paper, I
argue that greater attention to the internal dialogue of the cultural
community provides resources that open up new possibilities for
accommodating both sides of this dilemma.
Since Muna Ndulo has provided a detailed description of the types
of problems that arise regarding gender equality in customary law
systems in his excellent paper in this symposium, I will not repeat that
description.' In many cases, the legal system gets involved when a
cultural community seeks recognition or accommodation for a practice
that would otherwise violate the equality norms of their country's
constitution. The literature on multiculturalism has responded to this
conflict primarily by choosing one side or the other in the dilemma:
some theorists would sacrifice equality to protect culture while others
would sacrifice culture to protect equality.
In Part I of this paper, I explain why I believe both those responses
are unsatisfactory. I then turn, in Part II, to developing the theoretical
tools necessary to build an alternative: a constructivist view of culture
and a dialogic model focused on the need for challenge as part of the
dialogue. I argue that we must use these tools to focus on the dialogue
within the cultural community itself. If a community wants legal
protection for cultural practices that treat women unequally, it must
show that those practices are subject to a community dialogue in which
women have a meaningful opportunity to challenge and reinterpret
them. In Part III, I develop a framework for addressing these problems.
Finally, in Part IV, I offer some thoughts about how this framework
would apply to the issue of customary law in Liberia.
The conclusion I draw is that a rights-based approach, while
necessary, is not sufficient to deal with problems caused by the
structural distribution of power. Rather, we must look for ways to
redress the underlying power imbalances as well. And in this search,
legal mechanisms that create resources and opportunities for women to
shape the customary law of their own communities will be far more
effective than rights provisions that depend upon enforcement by the
state. In other words, in constitutional design terms, rights are not a
sufficient solution to structural problems.

1. See Muna Ndulo, African Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights, 18 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 87 (2010) (discussing the problems that arise regarding gender
equality in customary law systems).
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I. THE CONFLICT AND THE CURRENT LITERATURE
As Ayelet Shachar describes in her book, Multicultural
Jurisdictions,2 the literature has tended to resolve the problem of
discriminatory cultural practices by going to one extreme or the other:
some theorists would allow a cultural group to restrict or discriminate
against its own members with very few limits beyond a guarantee that
those members have freedom to exit,3 while other theorists would refuse
to allow any discrimination or restrictions that violate the rules
applicable within the majority legal culture. 4 Both of these extreme
responses are highly problematic.5
The problem with relying on exit as the basis for allowing
mistreatment of women is twofold. First, in order to function as a
justification, exit cannot simply be a theoretical possibility; it must be a
practical possibility. But economic, social, and emotional realities often
make exit a less than meaningful option for vulnerable people, including
many women.6 Second, even if exit is truly possible, this approach forces
a woman faced with discriminatory cultural practices to choose between
her rights as a citizen and her culture: since the only way to vindicate
the former is to exit from the latter, she cannot have both. 7
2. AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 63-71 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES 228, 247-48 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995).
4. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 9-24
(1999); see generally BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE & EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF
MULTICULTURALISM (2002).
5. For an argument that the international conventions in the area have made a
similar dichotomous choice, see Johanna Bond, Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in
Africa, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 509, 511-12 (2010) (arguing that the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women dismisses culture, failing to
see its importance to women, and the African Charter dismisses equality, protecting
culture even at the cost of gender equality).
6. See SARAH SONG, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM 16162 (2007) (describing psychological and practical conditions for meaningful exit); Sawitri
Saharso, Female Autonomy and Cultural Imperative: Two Hearts Beating Together, in
CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 224, 229-31 (Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman eds.,
2000) (describing how culture can limit the capacity for autonomy); see generally Oonagh
Reitman, On Exit, in MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND DIVERSITY
189, 192-204 (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeffrey Spinner-Haley eds., 2005) (arguing that exit
cannot play the protective and transformative roles assigned to it).
7. See SHACHAR, supra note 2, at 70-71. Gurpreet Mahajan has also pointed out that
exit is not a very meaningful option if the larger society continues to regard you (perhaps
because of the color of your skin or the ethnicity of your name) as a member of the
minority community even after you leave. Gurpreet Mahajan, Can Intra-group Equality
Co-exist with Cultural Diversity? Re-examining Multicultural Frameworks of
Accommodation, in MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES, supra note 6, at 90, 102.
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The alternative approach, by enforcing equality norms on all
cultural practices, leaves no room for the existence of communities that
dissent from the legal culture of equality. Here, our response might
differ depending on whether the dissenting cultural group represents a
majority or a minority. If the dissenting group is a minority, then the
issue here is simply whether or not one is willing to abandon cultural
and religious rights for minority groups. One might value the protection
of minority cultures for a variety of different reasons: the contribution of
cultural communities to individual autonomy, 8 the role of such
communities in providing the goods of belonging,9 or the value of
dissenters to the democratic dialogue in the larger society.' 0 But,
whatever the reason, much of the value will be lost if minority cultures
are squeezed out by the majority in this way." In other words, this
approach is really only possible for those who do not regard the
inclusion of minority cultures as an important priority of justice.
If the problematic culture is a majority culture, on the other hand,
then the question becomes whether legal sources of human rights-such
as a constitution or international convention-should be understood to
prevent the majority from expressing its culture through discriminatory
customary legal rules. Whatever one thinks of the theoretical
arguments in this context, there is a powerful pragmatic problem with
simply choosing equality rights over culture in this situation: it often
does not work very well.
First, it does not work very well because legal systems that include
both a commitment to gender equality and a commitment to a particular
customary or religious culture have not proven to be particularly good at
choosing gender equality when the two come into conflict. We may
believe that they should make this choice, but there is little practical
assurance that the people with power in such systems-judges,
government officials, and others who will be interpreting and applying
the laws-will actually do so. After all, these people are very likely to
share the majority culture that is in conflict with the equality norm, and

8. See generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS (1995).
9. See generally JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN
AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN IDENTITY (1992).
10. See MONIQUE DEVEAUX, CULTURAL PLURALISM AND DILEMMAS OF JUSTICE 34
(2000).
11. Cf. Jeff Spinner-Halev, Autonomy, Association, and Pluralism, in MINORITIES
WITHIN MINORITIES, supra note 6, at 157, 165 ("If all private groups are remade in the
image of the liberal state, then everyone's choices are reduced.")
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so they are likely to look for a way to compromise the two values rather
than simply choosing equality over culture.12
Second, even when these actors do choose to enforce gender equality
norms at the cost of cultural practices, such enforcement often does
women very little good. In many cases around the world, the result of
such efforts to impose greater equality has often been that the women
involved are worse off afterward. Sometimes this is because the women
are put under tremendous pressure by their communities to renounce
the benefits that the legal system is trying to extend to them, as in the
Shah Bano case in India.1s Sometimes this is because the community
forces the girls or women out of the public institutions in which the
more equal practice is enforced, as in the case of Turkish university
students who, either through their own choices or due to family
pressure, left the universities that would not allow them to wear
headscarves.14 If the goal is to help the actual, individual women whose
welfare is at stake in such cases, it is not at all clear that an
intransigent position by the legal system refusing to accommodate the
cultural community does in fact help these women.
Finally, this simple "either/or" approach to culture and equality fails
to recognize women's interests in being active members in and shapers
of their culture. Women are not merely the victims of culture: they "act
with agency, engaging with and reformulating cultural policy .

. .

. as

they work to eliminate discrimination within their cultural
communities."15 Constructing the problem as culture versus equality,
where the legal system simply has to choose a side, casts women as the
passive victims of culture rather than as its active creators. In so doing,
12. In many ways, South Africa may be the strongest case for the idea that a
commitment to gender equality can function as a trump over cultural rights that also have
constitutional status. But even in South Africa, where the Constitutional Court has
exercised tremendous initiative and where the constitutional commitment to gender
equality is stronger than in most other countries, the progress is probably best described
as two steps forward and one step back. See, e.g., Sara Jagwanth & Christina Murray, No
Nation Can Be Free When One Half of It Is Enslaved, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE 230 (Beverly Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 2005); Monique Deveaux,

Liberal Constitutions and Traditional Cultures: The South African Customary Law
Debate, 7 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 161 (2003) [hereinafter Deveaux, Liberal Constitutions]. In
Liberia, where the courts have much less experience with resisting other branches of
government and where the commitment to gender equality does not have as strong a
constitutional foundation, this strategy is likely to be significantly less successful.
13. Mohammad Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 S.C.C. 556 (India). For a
discussion of the Shah Bano case, see Martha Nussbaum, India, Sex Equality, and
Constitutional Law, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supranote 12,
at 174, 190-91.
14. See SONG, supra note 6, at 174-75.
15. Bond, supra note 5, at 511.
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it both falsifies the situation in which many women find themselves-a
situation in which they feel committed to both their culture and their
equality-and obscures possibilities for resolving these tensions in more
productive ways.
II. A FEMINIST APPROACH

So, how can a constitutional system respect and accommodate
customary law while also protecting and respecting the equality rights
of women? A number of feminist theorists have turned to a more
complex understanding of culture and to models of democratic dialogue
to provide a method for promoting both of these goals.
These theorists have insisted on a constructionist approach to
culture in which cultural communities are seen neither as isolated nor
as monolithic: cultures have always interacted with each other and
shaped one another and they have also always been internally
heterogeneous.' 6 Sarah Song describes four elements of this
constructivist model: (1) "cultures are the product of specific and
complex historical processes, not primordial entities"; (2) "cultures are
internally contested, negotiated, and reimagined by members, who are
sometimes motivated by their interactions with outsiders"; (3) "cultures
are not isolated but rather overlapping and interactive"; and (4)
"cultures are loose-jointed. . . . the loss or change of one strand does not
necessarily bring down the entire culture."17
For the purposes of this paper, the most important aspect of this
model is the internally contested nature of cultures. We must pay
attention to the power dynamics within a group and the ways in which
the cultural community's interaction with the legal system affects the
status, power, and resources of subgroups within the cultural
community. Certain forms of legal accommodation of culture have a
systematic effect of supporting traditional authority figures in the
community, and their views of the culture, at the expense of the power
and perspectives of more marginalized groups, including women. 18 For
example, reserving seats in the legislature for particular cultural groups
or incorporating traditional cultural norms into the state legal system
both tend to strengthen traditional leaders-who are overwhelmingly
16. See Iris Marion Young, Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group
Political Conflict, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, supra note 3, at 155, 159-61.
17. SONG, supra note 6, at 32.
18. See ANNE PHILLIPS, MULTICULTURALISM WITHOUT CULTURE 163 (2007) for a
critique of consociationalism for increasing the power of elites. Phillips also criticizes the
incorporation of traditional legal systems as making one interpretation of norms
authoritative. Id. at 169.
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male-as against more marginal or progressive elements in the
community. There is no neutral position for the state here: action and
inaction both have consequences for the distribution of power and status
inside the cultural community.
Many of the feminist theorists also look to democratic models of
dialogue as a mechanism for dealing with these problems. Anne Phillips
suggests that dialogue is the most promising approach because it
recognizes both difference and the possibility of intercultural
understanding and can encourage internal transformation of the
community.' 9 Similarly, Seyla Benhabib uses a deliberative model of
democracy to describe the interaction between majority and minority
cultural groups and how it can give rise to workable solutions to some of
these issues. 20 Iris Marion Young's well-known defense of certain forms
of group rights is based on a deliberative model of democracy. 21 Monique
Deveaux develops "a more robust conception of democracy," 22 which is a
deliberative model with some important modifications. 23 Sarah Song
asserts that democratic deliberation must have a central role in
determining which accommodations justice requires in multicultural
societies. 24 And Judith Squires endorses a vision of diversity politics
focused on contextual impartiality and democratic deliberation as the
basis for bringing feminism and multiculturalism together. 25 While
there are many real disagreements among these theorists about the
specific form and implementation of a deliberative democratic approach,
they all see this model as offering the best foundation for dealing with
multicultural issues.
I agree with these theorists that a democratic dialogue between the
many groups in a pluralist society is an important part of the process for
resolving the difficult cases concerning cultural accommodation. The
particular observation I want to offer here is that a dialogic, democratic
approach to the problem of cultural practices that violate equality
norms requires additional attention to the dynamics within the cultural
19. Id. at 161. She cautions, however, that the dialogue must be structured carefully or
it will tend to increase the power of authority structures within the community, for
example, by endorsing traditional leaders as spokespersons in the dialogue. Id. at 161-62.
20. SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE
GLOBAL ERA 105-46 (2002).
21. See generally IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2000).
22. DEVEAUX, supra note 10, at 3-5 (rejecting a requirement of consensus and insisting
that deliberative democracy is not neutral but based on specific norms, which must be
made explicit and justified).
23. Id. at 140-41.
24. See SONG, supra note 6 at 10.
25. Judith Squires, Culture, Equality and Diversity, in MULTICULTURALISM
RECONSIDERED 114, 120 (Paul Kelly ed., 2002).
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community and not only to dialogue between the community and the
larger society. While all of the theorists I am describing recognize this
issue, none of them has focused her attention on it.26 Their focus is on
the nature of the dialogue within the larger society: the conditions
under which that dialogue can take place, the role of the minority
community in that conversation, and the ways in which the dialogue
might contribute to the solution of hard cases.
Moreover, there is an element of the dialogic model that needs to be
made much clearer and should be the focus of attention in the
application of this model to the internal dialogue of a cultural
community. That element is challenge. A dialogic model of democracy
requires attention to the role of disruption and challenge in preventing
the reintroduction of domination and oppression. Such disruption and
challenge is crucial and cannot simply be assumed-incentives and
support for it must be built into the democratic structure. 27 Thus, one
important aim of accommodation in multicultural contexts should be to
provide support for such challenge by women within the community's
dialogue. Indeed, I believe that this approach is necessary, although not
26. Monique Deveaux has given the most attention to this issue in two writings. First,
in one essay, she offers a clearer statement of her conviction that democratic processes
must apply within the cultural minority community, and not just between that community
and the larger society. Monique Deveaux, A DeliberativeApproach to Conflicts of Culture,
in MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES, supra note 6, at 340, 343 [hereinafter Deveaux, A

DeliberativeApproach]. She also offers some guidelines for the dialogue that are useful for
internal as well as external purposes. Id. at 350-51 (including non-domination, political
equality, and revisability). Nonetheless, the example she uses to illustrate the process is
still an external conversation-between community members, outside experts, and
representatives of the larger society-rather than the ongoing, internal process of cultural
construction, interpretation, and implementation. Id. at 356-61 (describing the process of
public consultation preceding the passage of the South African Customary Marriages Act
of 1998). In her article, Liberal Constitutions and TraditionalCultures, she again suggests
the need for a dialogue within the cultural community. Deveaux, Liberal Constitutions,
supra note 12. Here she raises the important point that such struggles should be seen as
fundamentally political (i.e., about interests and power) rather than fundamentally
normative (i.e., about conflicts in values). Id. at 162. She suggests some guidelines to help
frame such dialogue: starting from norms that enjoy wide acceptance, looking for
compromise rather than for consensus on shared norms, focusing on concrete interests,
and preventing power abuses. Id. at 173-76. But, again, she is envisioning a process set up
by (and possibly mediated by) the state rather than a process internal to community. Id.
In addition, she does not consider the use of accommodation as itself a mechanism for
encouraging internal dialogue. This essay is intended to add those missing elements.
27. For a more detailed version of the argument for including the element of challenge
in a model of dialogic democracy, see Susan H. Williams, Equality, Representation, and
Challenge to Hierarchy: Justifying Electoral Quotas for Women, in CONSTITUTING
EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 53 (Susan H.

Williams ed., 2009). In that chapter, I apply this framework to the issue of electoral
gender quotas for women.
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sufficient, to any long-term solution to the difficulties posed by claims
for cultural accommodation that are in tension with a constitutional
commitment to equality.
In a model of dialogue based on democratic values, participants
engage in a collective process of "free and reasoned deliberation among
individuals considered as moral and political equals." 28 But a number of
theorists, including Bonnie Honig, Jane Mansbridge, and Nancy Fraser,
have recognized that there is a danger in a dialogic model that does not
reckon seriously enough with the ineradicability of power. 29 Difference
is inevitable, and there is constant pressure for people with power to use
existing differences to generate or reinforce hierarchy, thereby
undermining the necessary equality of the dialogue. The risk of a
deliberative model of democracy is that we will too quickly assume that
our deliberative processes are free of coercion (when they are not), or
that our dialogue has resulted in a good that is common (when it is not).
The ideal of a politics free of power and domination is an ideal worth
embracing, but if we think that any actual politics has achieved that
ideal, then we are allowing ourselves to be led astray by the dream.
This problem is particularly acute in the context I am addressing
here: the situation of women attempting to participate in and reshape
cultural institutions that include gender discriminatory and sexist
elements. As Johanna Bond points out:
Traditional leaders are primarily male elites who enjoy
significant social and political power..

.

. Women who

challenge customary norms as violative of gender
equality rights often enjoy considerably less political
power within their communities. Furthermore, the act of
openly challenging custom and tradition exposes those
women to increased stigma and ridicule within the
community.30
Simply allowing for a dialogue will be insufficient because of the
high likelihood that power will distort the dialogue through a variety of
28. Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 67, 68
(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) [collection hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE].

29. See Bonnie Honig, Difference, Dilemmas, and the Politics of Home, in DEMOCRACY
AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 28, at 257-77; Jane Mansbridge, Using Power/Fighting
Power: The Polity, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 28, at 46-66; Nancy

Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing
Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 109, 123 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992).
30. Bond, supranote 5, at 562.
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mechanisms. For example, women may feel uncomfortable speaking up
in the public context because of gender role expectations.3 1 Or the
dialogue may be conducted within frames of reference that reinforce
existing power hierarchies and are largely unnoticed because they
coincide with existing social realities. 32 In short, dialogue alone, without
direct and sustained attention to creating incentives and opportunities
for challenge, will be insufficient.3 3
As a result, we need mechanisms for ensuring that the people most
likely to be marginalized in the dialogue are included and heard. We
need to build into the model of dialogue attention to the risks of
exclusion and hierarchy as well as incentives and opportunities to
challenge them. One way to do this is to focus on these issues in the
context of claims for cultural accommodation. In this context,
accommodation is more warranted as the cultural group demonstrates
more willingness to carry on an internal dialogue in which such
challenge is possible. Taking this approach is not the same as asking
whether the cultural practices at issue in the accommodation claim are
consistent with liberal individual rights. Here we are focused not on the
specific practices at issue in the accommodation, but on the methods
through which such practices are created, interpreted, and
implemented. If those methods-and the background conditions under
which they operate-allow for meaningful challenge, then the legal
system should offer a greater degree of accommodation to the cultural
practice, even if the practice includes some features that might
otherwise be seen as inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to
equality.
31. See Heike Becker, 'New Things After Independence' Gender and Traditional
Authorities in Postcolonial Namibia, 32 J. S. AR. STUD. 29, 42-43 (2006) (explaining that
both men and women describe women as too "shy" to participate in public meetings).
32. See Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL.
THEORY 670, 686 (2001).
33. Because of these concerns about power, Johanna Bond argues that the dialogic
model should be limited to "localized modes of [norm] implementation" and that the norms
themselves should be taken from the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of
Women in Africa. Bond, supra note 5, at 513, 510-16. I do not believe that this is an
adequate solution for two reasons. First, the two tasks of establishing norms and
providing localized modes of implementing them can not be as neatly separated as Bond
suggests. I am afraid that the power to implement or apply is essentially the power to
define the norms themselves. As a result, I am not as optimistic as Bond that this
substantive limit will have the effect of restricting the degree of harm to women. Second,
as Bond herself recognizes, "limiting the scope of deliberation will not eliminate the power
disparities that necessitate the approach in the first place." Id. at 567. I believe we are
better served by a dialogic model that takes on the issue of structural inequality directly,
rather than merely attempting to contain the reach of such inequalities by limiting the
scope of the deliberation.
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Openness to challenge is not an all-or-nothing matter. There is a
minimum level of dialogic openness that is required of all communities,
in the form of bans on extreme coercion, such as imprisonment.3 4 But,
beyond this minimum, the legal system should continue to encourage
the development of more inclusive and open dialogic conditions within
the community. Assuring that the internal dialogue within a community
includes challenge to inequality and domination requires that the
vulnerable members of that community have a meaningful voice in the
dialogue. Many writers have outlined the theoretical requirements for
such a dialogue, but these are not particularly useful in a context in
which the inequalities are deep and structural and there is no forum in
which they can simply be eliminated.35 The goal is not to create a list of
preconditions for an equal dialogue, since such conditions will surely be
unmet in any realistic setting in which these conversations might take
place. Instead, the goal is to identify practical mechanisms for creating
resources, opportunities, and incentives that will move the dialogic
participants toward ever greater inclusivity and openness to challenge.
III. APPLICATION TO CUSTOMARY LAW

There are three different mechanisms the legal system could use to
encourage and support internal dissent and challenge. First, the legal
system could increase the capacity for challenge by giving women within
the cultural community recognition and social capital. Second, the legal
34. It is interesting to note the high level of consensus among the feminist theorists I
am describing on the identification of a category of accommodation claims that all of them
would reject. These are claims where the harm visited on the vulnerable member by
cultural practices is severe, generally physical, and in clear violation of the generally
applicable criminal laws. For example, all of these theorists agree that the "cultural
defense" should not excuse a man who kills his wife or other female family member in a
so-called "honor" killing. If such a defense were accepted, that would effectively function
as an exemption for members of that cultural group from the usual criminal laws on
murder. While the writers I describe offer different views about why these defenses should
not have this result, and also differ on what other relevance (if any) such cultural
information might have in a criminal case, they all agree that no exemption is appropriate
here. Perhaps one might say that these cases form an "overlapping consensus" among
feminists who are sympathetic to the claims of cultural communities about where the
limits of accommodation lie.
35. For example, Monique Deveaux proposes that one of the requirements of the
dialogue is political equality between participants: the opportunity to participate in and
influence the outcome of the dialogue cannot be affected by other sorts of inequalities,
such as wealth, power, and gender. Deveaux, A Deliberative Approach, supra note 26, at
350-51. While I believe this is a wonderful ideal, I am afraid that it is likely to be
unattainable in most communities for the forseeable future. As a result, a more limited
and more specific set of concerns would be more useful as guidelines for resolving these
issues. The requirements discussed in text are intended as a first cut at such specific
guidelines for an adequate level of guaranteed participation.
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system could increase women's capacity for challenge by redistributing
practical resources to them, such as economic power and education.
Third, the legal system could offer the community accommodation of its
unequal cultural practices on the condition that it adopts internal
dialogic processes that provide opportunities to challenge dominant
practices. The first two mechanisms are aimed at ensuring that women
have the resources and capacity for making challenges; the third
mechanism is aimed at ensuring that they have the opportunity to use
that capacity.
In implementing all three of these methods, however, it is important
for the state to enlist the cooperation of traditional community leaders
as much as possible. Otherwise, the state's support and encouragement
for the women will simply lead the rest of their community to demonize
them as a tool of the oppressive outside culture. There is probably no
way to avoid this completely, but the more that the interests and status
of the traditional leaders can be tied to the recognition and
empowerment of women, the less powerful this negative response will
be.
A. Recognition
The state needs to seek out and support multiple representatives
and spokespeople for women within cultural communities, preferably
long before any specific claim seeking accommodation is raised. This can
often be best achieved in the realm of public debate and discussion,
outside of the particular arena of government. For example, mainstream
news media should routinely look for representatives of women's groups
internal to minority communities for comment on issues concerning that
community. Civil society organizations seeking input from
representatives of a particular community should do the same. And
government also should seek out and invite participation by women's
groups internal to cultural communities as part of any consultation
process.
It is difficult to enlist the traditional community leaders in this
process because they are very likely to endorse women's representatives
who are less critical of traditional authority, which would, of course,
undermine the purpose of supporting challenge. So, it is probably not
useful to attempt to involve these traditional leaders in the process of
identifying women's representatives. It is, however, extremely useful to
bring the traditional leaders together with the women's representatives
in conversations about the community's needs and concerns. If these
conversations take place in contexts in which both sets of leaders are
representing the community's interests to the larger society (i.e., in a
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context not focused on an accommodation opposed by the women), then
there is the possibility for a positive dynamic. In many cases, they are
likely to agree on at least some of the goals of the community, and the
opportunity to discover such common ground in the context of
presenting the community's desires to the larger society can help to
build trust and cooperation between these leaders. 36
B. Redistribution
The state needs to offer practical support to women that will
increase their power to speak up and challenge the hierarchies in their
own communities. Such support might take the form of opportunities for
education, economic development, and protection from domestic and
other forms of intracommunity violence. As many observers have noted,
the reason that exit is an insufficient solution is that women often
experience very substantial barriers to exit, in the form of economic,
educational, and social limitations that dramatically raise the cost of
leaving.37 At a minimum, the state should provide the sort of support
that reduces the impact of such limits.
The state should also try to enlist the support of traditional
community leaders for programs that provide resources to the women of
the community. The goal is for these leaders to see such programs as
benefitting the community as a whole. One way to encourage that view
would be to offer the benefits (e.g., education and economic development
support) to both men and women in the community, but to increase the
amount of support based on the percentage of recipients who are
women. For example, the state might offer scholarship aid to members
of a disadvantaged group, and the total amount available for
scholarships might increase as the percentage of women participating in
the scholarship program increases. Or the state might enlist women by
using their traditional roles (e.g., as mothers) to give them resources
and training (e.g., on organizing and teaching) that will increase their
capacity more generally. Another method is for the government to
provide public recognition for the traditional leaders in communities
with high rates of female participation in programs like these two
examples. The goal is to craft mechanisms that create incentives for the
community leaders to encourage women to take advantage of these
opportunities, rather than the reverse.

36. See id. at 356-58 (describing how women, along with traditional leaders, supported
some customary practices in the discussion over the South African Customary Marriages
Act.)
37. See supranote 6.
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C. Accommodation Tied to Dialogue
Most importantly, the state should tie accommodation of cultural
practices to the development and support of internal dialogic practices
that are inclusive and open to challenge. If the state specified the
precise dialogic practices required, it would be very likely to create a
backlash of what Ayelet Shachar has called "reactive culturalism":
where the minority community hardens its own cultural barriers to
equality in response to pressure by the majority to be more
egalitarian.3 8 In order to minimize this dynamic, the legal system
should set out the general goals of the dialogic practice and then leave it
to the cultural community to come up with the precise mechanisms for
promoting those goals. When a community requests an accommodation,
the community would bear the burden of showing that its internal
dialogue includes the necessary openness to challenge in order to justify
that accommodation. The community must demonstrate that it has
strong internal mechanisms to allow such challenges to be made, heard,
and considered, so that its cultural practices have the capacity to adapt
over time to the needs, desires, and values of its members.
The general guidelines or goals for such an inclusive and open
internal dialogue should include at least three parts. First, the process
must allow information about alternatives to the current practice. There
must be opportunities for people to hear about how other communities
handle similar issues and about alternative interpretations of their
community's traditions and practices. Moreover, the traditional leaders
cannot monopolize the presentation of this information; people who
actually support these alternative practices must be allowed to speak in
favor of them. I realize that some communities would prefer that their
members not be aware of alternative practices or interpretations, but
such ignorance is inconsistent with any robust model of dialogue,
particularly once we see challenge as a central part of dialogue. If
challengers are limited to making arguments against the current
orthodoxy, without being able to present alternatives to it, they will be
seriously disadvantaged.
Second, the dialogue must include broad participation by dissenters.
Those who wish to challenge the traditional practice, or the traditional
leaders' interpretation of that practice, must be given meaningful
opportunities to do so. A meaningful opportunity would generally mean
at least that (1) different groups within the community must be allowed
to speak for themselves and cannot be forced to be represented by
spokespersons not of their choosing, and (2) the dissenters must be
38. SHACHAR, supra note 2, at 35-37.

DEMOCRACY, GENDER EQUALITY, AND CUSTOMARY LAW

79

heard by a broader audience than just the traditional leaders of the
community. The point here is that the dissenters must be given the
39
chance to affect the culture of their community.
Third, the ultimate decision of the community on the practice at
issue must demonstrate some recognition of and concern for the views of
dissenters. This does not mean that the community must necessarily
adopt the views of the dissenters, but it cannot completely ignore them
either. It must show that it has considered them and attempted to
accommodate them to some extent. One aspect of this concern is
captured by Monique Deveaux's requirement that the outcomes of such
dialogue must be revisable-they must be seen as capable of being
reopened and altered in the future. 40 Revisability is necessary to assure
dissenters that their concerns have not been permanently foreclosed,
but it may not be sufficient for the purposes of the requirement I am
describing. In addition to revisability, the community must demonstrate
some understanding of and sympathy for the concerns of dissenters. In
other words, the community must demonstrate some of the same
willingness to accommodate its own minorities that it is requesting from
41
the legal system for itself.
IV. AN ILLUSTRATION: LIBERIA
Let me illustrate the application of this approach by taking an
example from my work as a constitutional advisor in Liberia. Liberia is
a country of approximately three million people in West Africa. It is a
multicultural society that includes dozens of tribal groups with different
languages, cultures, and religious traditions. Liberia has suffered from
a brutal civil war that lasted for most of the period between 1989 and
2003. The war destroyed the infrastructure of the country-including
power, water, and road systems-and disrupted social institutions,
including the educational and political systems, the clan and village
structures, and families. In 2005, Liberia held its first election since the
civil war and elected the first woman head of state in Africa, Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf. Liberia has substantial natural resources, including
39. There may be additional procedural requirements that are necessary to allow the
voices of vulnerable internal minorities to be heard effectively. For example, if women are
afraid to speak up publicly because of the risk of retribution, then there would need to be
anonymous mechanisms for participation. The specific conditions necessary for honest
participation will vary with the circumstances of different communities of women. So, the
suggestions in text, while necessary, may not be sufficient as conditions for assuring
adequate dialogue.
40. Deveaux, A DeliberativeApproach, supranote 26, at 350-52.
41. See Leslie Green, Internal Minorities and Their Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES, supranote 3, at 257.
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rubber, timber, forest crops, and iron, but it faces enormous challenges
in every area of life: social, economic, political, educational, and legal.
The Liberian Constitution is largely based on the U.S. Constitution
and creates a legal order with many of the features of a liberal state.
The Constitution includes a right to gender equality 42 and also makes a
commitment to promote cultures and traditional values that "are
compatible with public policy and national progress." 43 This provision is
understood to authorize the recognition of customary legal systems, 44
but the system that has evolved in Liberia is complicated. First, there is
the civil or state-run system, in which the official courts apply the
statutory law created by the legislature and the common law developed
by those courts. The family and personal law applied by the state courts
has been reformed in recent years to promote greater gender equality.
Second, there is the informal customary law system in which local
leaders are asked by those involved to resolve disputes in accordance
with local custom. And third, there is a hybrid system, in which tribal
chiefs appointed by the President sit as magistrates and apply a
combination of statutory codifications of customary laws and actual
local customs.
In many places in Africa, colonial occupation has left a complicated
legacy for customary legal systems. In some countries, the local chiefs
were co-opted by the colonial authorities and came to be seen as
collaborators during the movement for independence. As a result, their
authority was compromised to varying degrees and needed to be reestablished during the post-independence period.45 In addition, in many
places, the colonial authorities sought to codify customary law through a
process that privileged the interpretations of traditional authorities
(mostly male) and that hardened the rules in a way antithetical to a
living legal tradition. 46
Although Liberia never experienced a colonial occupation, it has
nonetheless had similar problems. In the absence of a colonial
administration, local chiefs have been discredited in a similar way by
their dependence on the President. The chiefs are chosen by the
President and serve at the President's pleasure. Liberia has a history of
42. Article 11(b) provides that "[a]ll persons, irrespective of ... sex ... are entitled to
the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. . . ." The following subsection (c)
provides that "[a]ll persons are equal before the law and therefore entitled to the equal
protection of the law." Constitution of Republic of Liberia, Jan. 6, 1986, art. 11(b),(c).
43. Id. art. 5(b).

44. In addition, the Constitution mentions customary law directly in article 23(b),
where it calls upon the legislature to enact laws to govern "rights of inheritance and
descent for spouses of both statutory and customary marriages." Id. art. 23(b).
45. See, e.g., Becker, supranote 31, at 33-34.
46. See Deveaux, Liberal Constitutions,supranote 12, at 164-65.
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excessively powerful, corrupt, and dictatorial presidents. As a result,
these chiefs are often seen more as corrupt politicians than as
traditional leaders. Liberia has also experienced the same process of
codification of customary law as other African nations. In the absence of
a colonial power, the resulting legislation is not seen as a tool of an
external culture, but it nonetheless suffers from the same flaws of
privileging the traditional authorities and freezing the living nature of
the law.
Customary law for many of the tribal groups in Liberia includes
gender discriminatory practices, including the treatment of adult
women as minors, the inability of women to inherit property either from
their fathers or their husbands, the tradition of levirate, polygyny, bride
price, and female genital cutting.47 There is great controversy in Liberia
now over which customary rules ought to continue to be enforced and
respected and over the interaction between the civil and customary legal
systems. The approach developed in this article suggests that one very
important consideration should be the ways in which the state-based
legal system can empower women within the tribal communities to
challenge customary practices that hurt them. Below, I point out three
applications of this approach.
First, Liberian women, particularly in rural communities, need
much greater support to be able to speak up effectively. One avenue,
which has been promoted with energy and determination by the
Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia, is education for women about
the legal rights and remedies available to them. In addition, the
reconstruction of the educational system-with particular attention to
school attendance by girls-is a crucial, long-term support for girls and
women in their efforts to shape their communities. There are a great
number of issues related to breaking down barriers to girls' education,
including: eliminating school fees, ensuring girls' safety in and on the
way to school, and educating the public about the value of educated girls
to the community. 48
Obviously, reconstructing the educational system is a large-scale,
long-term reform, and the customary law issues will not be able to wait
until this reform has been achieved. But the connection here has an

47. For descriptions of some of these practices among different groups, see, for
example, CAROLINE H. BLEDSOE, WOMEN AND MARRIAGE IN KPELLE SOCIETY 82-117 (1980)
and GONTER SCHRODER & DIETER SEIBEL, ETHNOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF SOUTHEASTERN
LIBERIA: THE LIBERIAN KRAN AND THE SAPO 126-40 (1974).
48. Higher educational levels for women correspond to lower levels of fertility and
higher levels of child health. See Martha Ainsworth et al., The Impact of Women's

Schooling on Fertility and Contraceptive Use: A Study of Fourteen Sub-Saharan African
Countries, 10 WORLD BANK EcoN. REV. 85-122 (1996).

82

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1

important implication for the issue of customary law. The state-lased
legal system should allow customary law to vary from the civil law rules
to a greater extent as this educational reconstruction progresses
further. This linkage should help recruit traditional leaders, who want a
wider scope for customary law, to support the reconstruction and reform
of the educational system and the enrollment of female students.
Second, the hybrid system should be abandoned. In place of
presidentially appointed chiefs, the tribal communities should be
encouraged to develop decision-making mechanisms that both reflect
local custom and incorporate meaningful opportunity for dialogue and
challenge. Moreover, these mechanisms should be under much more
local control, so that they can vary from one village to another even
within a particular tribal group. This decentralization will not only
make the system more accessible for people in rural Liberia, but also
will allow the development of alternative approaches and
interpretations that will open space for challenge to cultural orthodoxies
(e.g., "if they do things differently in the next village over, even though
they are Krahn, just like us, then maybe we can do things differently
here as well"). The government bureaucracy charged with overseeing
the customary legal system should keep records about the procedures
adopted in different localities and widely disseminate this information
so that people in the villages can learn about good ideas that have been
tried elsewhere.
Moving back to a more local, flexible, and custom-based system will,
of course, create a potential for variations that are harmful to women,
but local Liberian cultures include meaningful resources for building
more democratic and egalitarian systems. For example, among the
Glebo of the southeastern part of Liberia, there is a tradition of female
leaders with positions parallel to male leaders: a women's chief, a
women's council, and even a role for the wife of the high priest, which
includes many of the same duties and ritual prohibitions as her
husband's. Moreover, important decisions, such as whether to go to war,
could traditionally be vetoed by the women's council and chief.49 There
is also a tradition of mass action by women to demand attention for
issues the male authorities are ignoring. This tradition continues into
the current era. One particularly powerful example was a strike
organized by the Market Women's Association during the presidency of
Samuel Doe in the 1990s. The women refused to return to work until
Doe released a group of student activists (whom the women referred to
49. MARY H. MORAN, LIBERIA: THE VIOLENCE OF DEMOCRACY 40-42 (2006). For a
fascinating account of similar structures in Namibia (including female chiefs and women's
participation in traditional community meetings) and their revitalization in certain
localities, see Becker, supra note 31, at 29-48.
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as their children) who had been sentenced to death for their political
oppopition.50
Given these resources, it is inappropriate to assume that traditional
mechanisms will automatically or inevitably be unfair to women. The
factors that influence the ability of women to make use of these
resources are many and varied. They surely include the political and
economic pressures at work in any given community, national and
international influences, and the agency of individuals and groups at
the local level. 51 Because these factors are complex and vary from one
locality to another, there is no way to know in advance whether or not
women will be able to use these resources effectively in a given case. As
a result, the point should not be to map out in advance the particular
forms such customary practices or institutions should take, but rather
to design incentives, opportunities, and resources that will allow women
in these communities to make whatever creative use of cultural
resources they can. Examples of useful elements in such an incentive or
opportunity structure include: information about a range of possible
practices (produced and distributed by the government), support and
training for women who are seeking to reconstruct their local practices
through NGOs and government agencies, and the ultimate constraint
imposed by the court system and the constitution.
My third suggestion is to abandon and reverse the process of
codification of customary law. In Liberia, the national legislature has
codified some customary law in statutes intended to be applied by the
customary legal system. These statutes should be reconsidered and, in
many cases, repealed. The practice of codification has the unfortunate
effect of freezing customary law as of the moment it was memorialized,
and generally in a form approved by traditional leaders without any
consideration of dissenting voices within the community. Customary
systems should be encouraged to see themselves as living parts of the
culture, adapting and growing in response to the changing needs and
views of the community. Allowing communities to engage in this process
of developing their customary law, through practices that meet the
standards outlined above for a dialogue open to challenge, will create
opportunities for women to participate in the interpretation and growth
of customary law.
There are a number of ways that this model of dialogue could be
implemented legally. First, as I have suggested, it could be made a
condition for the granting of recognition for a customary law or an
accommodation for a customary practice by a court in a case where a
50. See MORAN, supra note 49, at 46-50 (describing this and other incidents).
51. See Becker, supra note 31, at 31 (arguing for the role of local agency along with
external forces).
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cultural community requests such recognition or accommodation. This
approach is the simplest in terms of existing legal mechanisms and has
the advantage of putting the ball in the community's court, as it were:
the process is activated by the community and for its own reasons. In
addition, there are mechanisms that might allow a more proactive
approach in which the state would require a community to develop such
an open dialogic process, independent of any request by the community
for accommodation. The Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of
Women in Africa includes a novel and important provision assuring
women the right "to participate at all levels in the determination of
cultural policies." 52 Similarly, some countries, such as Namibia, have
adopted constitutional or statutory provisions that guarantee women
some representation or participation in customary systems. 53 These
options are not available in Liberia, which has not signed the Protocol
and does not have such a statute, but they open up important
possibilities in other contexts.
CONCLUSION
Let me use the Liberian example to make one final point. I
understand that there is a great risk in turning to internal community
dialogue to deal with this problem. The cultural evolution that this
model hopes to encourage is often a very slow process, and, in the
meantime, the women in these communities will be harmed by the
persistent gender inequalities enforced by customary law. I do not wish
to minimize the costs that women will bear during the time it will take
for them to gradually change their cultures. There is a reason, however,
why I think that accepting these costs is often the best path to a future
of greater equality.
Even if the state could enforce gender equality in a particular casewhich it often is not able to do-in the long run, the welfare of the
women in these communities depends on their ability to participate
effectively in the shaping of their own culture. If women are dependent
on the legal system to step in and redress inequality, then they will be
disadvantaged forever. Such state intervention is all too likely to cause
a backlash against any women who dare to challenge traditional leaders
52. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, art. 17(1), adopted July 11, 2003, available at http://www.africaunion.org/rootlaulDocuments/Treaties/Text/Protocol on the Rights of Women.pdf; see Bond,
supra note 5, at 522-23 (arguing that this procedural right provides an important
mechanism for assuring women's participation in customary systems).

53. Becker, supra note 31, at 32 (explaining that the Traditional Authorities Act of
1995 "requires traditional authorities to promote women to positions of leadership").
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or practices. The only way to make stable progress toward equality is for
the cultural community to move towards this future through
mechanisms it understands to be its own. As a result, one of the most
useful things the legal system can do is to create incentives for these
communities to adopt such mechanisms. This is why, in the long run,
simply protecting individual rights in individual cases is insufficient to
achieve equality. Inequality is a structural problem and it requires
structural solutions, not just human rights. Equality will only be
secured once we have opened the channels for women to make internal
change within their own communities. Tying recognition and
accommodation to the development of a community dialogue in which
challenge is a realistic possibility is one useful way to begin this process.

